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I. Introduction
In the past few years, the nature of Philippine informal credit
markets hasgained priority in the agendaof academicsand govern-
ment agencies.Farm-level studies were undertaken with particular
emphasison the documentation of informal loan arrangementsand
the determination of interest rates (TBAC-UPBRF 1981; TBAC
1981; QuiEones 1982; Swaminathan 1982; Serrano 1983; TBAC
1984; and Sacay et al. 1985). In the context of modern agriculture
which is dependent upon purchasedinputs, the study of informal
credit takes on addedsignificance. Accessto modern inputs is part-
ly determined by the extent to which householdscan avail them-
selvesof credit to meet their cash flow requirements and by the
terms under which it can be obtained. Given the shortcomingsand
inherent limitations of the formal credit sector in allocating rural
credit, the role played by the informal credit market in the promo-
tion of new technology becomeseven more significant.
This paper examines the impact of technical change on the
structure of informal credit markets in the Philippine rice and corn
sectors and draws policy implications. It investigateshow technical
change hasaffected both the debt burden and repayment capacity
of borrowers and the composition of lendersand their perception
of the different groups of borrowers. Relationshipsbetween lenders
and borrowers are also examined, particularly the various terms
under which they participate in credit transactions.
The findings presented in the paper have considerable impact
on a wide range of policy issues.Some policymakers and economic
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advisers believe that the culprit behind the present credit dilemma
in Philippine agriculture is government intervention vis-a-visrepres-
sive financial policies. This hasonly led to market distortions espe-
cially in the formal credit sector rather than to the development
of rural financial markets. The inability of the formal financial in-
stitutions to provide an effective credit delivery and savingsmobiliza-
tion system in the rural areasprodded Philippine policymakers to
considerinformal lendersasconduitsfor ruralcredit.
However, the question of whether informal lenders should be
utilized as agentsin rural credit allocation or whether banksshould
be encouragedto adopt strategiessimilar to thoseof informal lenders
requires some understanding of the informal credit market opera-
tions and of the nature of informal credit relations. Unfortunately,
government officials often proceed to implement certain policies
without carefully examining the nature of the market they are
addressing.In this regard, the findings of this paper can serveasa
cornerstone for developing moreeffective policieson credit.
II. Data Sourcesand Methodology
The discussion of informal credit markets draws heavily from
my dissertation (1987) on a survey sample of 111 farmer-bor-
rowers (eight of whom were also farmer-lenders) and eight trader-
lenders conducted during the first half of 1984. The survey re-
spondents were drawn from fourteen (14) villages (barrios) in five
Philippine municipalities, namely: Talavera and jaen in the province
of Nueva Ecija, Tigbauan and Oton in the province of Iloilo, and
Solana in the province of Cagayan (see Map 1).
The first part of that study made a distinction between unfavor-
able (marginal) and favorable (developed) areas was made to high-
light possible differences in credit exchange which might reflect
the effect of modern technology and commercialization. Favor-
able areas refer to irrigated, high-productivity, and more commer-
cialized villages while unfavorable areas refer to the rainfed, low-
productivity, and less commercialized villages. A schematic diagram
is presented in Appendix 1 to illustrate how the villages in the dif-
ferent municipalities are classifiedunder the study areacategory.
Given an agrarian setting, the different economic positions of
market agentsin the production and distribution processes are taken
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agriculture are thus examined, taking into account both the diverse
environmental and technical conditions aswell asthe heterogeneous
character of market agents.
The paper also provides a brief overview of rural credit poli-
cies in the Philippines and alsoexamines the possibleconsequences
of the different policy strategiescurrently being considered. Both
the Flora study and other credit studiesdone by academicresearch-
ers and government agenciesare utilized to draw out the efficiency
and equity impact of the policy schemes,especially those using
informal lendersas conduits for channelling credit in the agricultural
sector.
III. The Impact of Technical Changeon the Structure
of Informal Credit Markets
In recent decades, credit relations in Philippine agriculture have
changed alongside the development of production and marketing
systems. The introduction of modern technology, in particular,
facilitated the emergence of new types of credit arrangements and
brought about changes in the level of household debt burden as well
as in the composition of informal lenders. These developments
have substantially altered the character of the informal credit mar-
ket, allowing it to adjust and to meet the credit needs of an increas-
ingly market-oriented rural population.
A. Changes in the Household Debt Level
The introduction of modern technology in the mid-sixties to
boost agricultural production in the Philippines has led to an
increased demand for credit. The need for capital inputs and hired
labor, in addition to consumption requirements, compelled farmers
to seek out more loans. This helped reinforce the strategic necessity
of credit among the rural population. At the same time, the increase
in output and, hence, in farmers' earnings as a result of technical
change in production methods prompted lenders to provide more
loans to farmers since bigger anticipated harvests raised the repay-
ment capacity of the latter.
While the promotion of modern technology resulted in the rapid
growth of agricultural production, particularly rice which is the
staple food, it did not necessarily reduce the relative debt level of236 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
farm households. This is because the relative increase in farmer's
income was insufficient to offset the increase in cash requirements.
Floro's findings support this argument. Using the Philippine rice
and corn sectors as a case study, she computed the average debt-
burden of farm households in the favorable or developed areas as
well as in the unfavorable or marginal areas.1 Income differentials
across households in each study area were also taken into account.
The study noted that households adopting new production meth-
ods have larger loan volumes than their counterparts in the un-
favorable or marginal area (Table 1). This was expected consider-
TABLE 1
DEBT BURDEN INDICES OF 111 SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS
BY INCOME CLASS AND STUDY AREA CATEGORY,
WET SEASON, 1983.84




Poor 2,581 0.80 (0.81)
Middle 3,657 0.40 (0.11)
Rich 13,890 0.28 (0.46)
II. FavorableArea
Poor 4,602 1.29 (0.56)
Middle 9,301 1.02 (0.47)
Rich 13,780 0.60 (0.14)
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Floro(1987).
1. A Schematicdiagram is presented in Appendix 1 to illustrate how the
villages in the different municipalities are categorized into favorable and unfa-
vorable areas.The householdsin thesevillages are then grouped on the basisof
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ing the relatively larger purchased input requirements of households
which adopt modern production methods. Lenders may also be
willing to provide larger loans to the households in the developed
areas due to higher productivity and, hence, higher expected farm
earnings.
A borrower's capacity to pay, however, is not measured by the
absolute size of his debt. Rather, it is determined by the proportion
of total debt to his available resources or earnings for that period.
One possible indicator of a household's ability to repay loans is the
size of its earnings relative to the expected loans payment. In other
words, the repayment capacity of the borrower depends on wheth-
er his net income for that period is sufficient to cover his out-
standing loan obligations. The debt burden index (B/Y) is therefore
a useful measurement for this purpose. 2
The debt-burden index is defined as the ratio of one period's
outstanding loan obligations of a household which are due at the
end of the period plus expected interest charges to total income
earnings for the same period. Multiperiod or multipayment loans
are not included in the calculation of the debt-burden index. Since
89.7 percent and 93.8 percent of the loans borrowed by households
in the favorable and unfavorable areas, respectively, were provided
2. Using Nisbet's definition, the (B/Y) index refersto the ratio of a house-
hold's total outstandingloan obligation for one period plusexpected interest
charges,B, I;o total incomeearned for the sameperiod, net of all expensesex-
cept loan and interestpayments,Y. A debt burdenindexof one impliesthat the
farm household'sannualearningsjust sufficiesto meet the period's loan obli-
gations.Obviously, a valueof one isan onerousdebtburden- andmoresofor
greater than one value. An index greater than one suggests that, evenif the
householdusesup all of itsearningsto repayits loans, it would still have out-
standingloansat the endof the period.
It is important to emphasizethat while B/Y index refersto the ratio of cred-
it flow and income flow for the duration of a specifiedperiod, the B/Q and
B/N indicesareratiosof the stock of outstandingloansat the end of theperiod
to stock of output and land, respectively.The stock-flow distinction in this
casedoes not affect our computationsof B significantly.This isbecause farm
householdstend to wait till harvest(end of the period) to pay back any out-
standingloans.Hence the flow of credit to the householdfor the duration of
the period includingrenewedand recontractcdloansthat were unpaid in the
previousperiod isequivalentto the debt stock of the householdat the end of
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by informal lenders (Chart 1), and since the stipulated loan ,periods
of the majority of informal loans were short (32 weeks or less) as
shown in Table 2, then a significant share of the total household
loans is expected to be paid at the end of one production period.
The income-based comparison of the (B/Y) indices in Table 1
indicates that poor borrowers have a higher debt burden than rich
borrowers. Poor households are indebted by nearly 1.3 times the
amount they earned while rich households are expected to pay 60
percent of their total net earnings for maturing loans. Comparing
indices between study areas, the relative debt burden of farm house-
holds in the favorable or developed area is found to be higher than
for those in the unfavorable or marginal area.
The above findings were further supported by the statistical re-
sults from a multiple regression analysis. Floro (1987) found a high-
ly significant negative correlation between the household's debt
burden level and income. The statistical tests also indicated that
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF LOANS
WITH STIPULATED LENGTH OF LOAN PERIOD
BY TYPE OF LENDER, BY STUDY AREA CATEGORY,
WET SEASON, 1983-84
Marginal area Developed area
Farmer-lender Trader-lender Farmer-lender Trader-lender
Length of loans loans loans loans
loan period
(in weeks)
1 - 8 .054 .107 .111 .049
9 - 12 .378 .114 .302 .197
17 - 24 .324 .707 .397 .'/07
25 - 32 .162 .071 .159 .04-5
33 - 40 .027 .000 .032 .000
41 - 52 .054 .000 .000 .000
fCHART I
A SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF ALL LOAN SOURCES, 111 FARM HOUSEHOLDS r-'_
o
WET SEASON T983-84 :0





100.00%-- developed area__ r
°
100.00°_ marginal area ",1.
m
_o
FORMAL SOURCES INFORMAL SOURCES .._
(numberof loans:36-) (numberof loans:412) ]>
16.26% -- developed 89.74% -- developed -n
6.16% - marginal 93.94%- marginal
I
I f 1
1. Rural Banks COMMERCIAL NON-COMMERCIAL
2. LandBank (numberof loans:297) (numberof loans:115)
3. PhilippineNationalBank 77.64%- developed 12.10°_ - developed
4. Cooperative RuralBank 84.25% - marginal 9.59% - mar_inat
S.Other financialinstitutions | | I |
1. Teachers INDIVIDUALS VILLAGE
2. RichFarmers I COOPERATIVES
3. LandJords I
4. Others 1. Neighbors
2. Relatives
3. Friends
Merchants/traders categoryincludeagentbuyers,miller-bu yers,andwholesaLer'miIter'bu yers. M
b. Richfarmersaredefinedasthosecultivatingat least5.0 ha.of land. ¢_
c. OthersIncludeteachers,localgovernment officials,employees, etc. ¢D-240 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
bor.rower householdsin the developed area have a higher debt bur-
den than their counterpartsin the marginalarea.
These results can be explained by the relative vulnerability of
households to the terms-of-trade effect. Borrowers in the favor-
able areaaremore affected by market fluctuations because of greater
market dependence for their production and consumption needs.
The unfavorable terms-of-trade for agriculture has increasedthe
debt burden for those householdswho rely moreheavily on modern
inputs and who market a biggerproportion of their output. This
has been aggravated by government pricing policies which "have
undervalued agricultural production during the last decade through
lower product pricesand higher input prices" (David 1982, p. 17).3
Due to the heavy debt burden of farmers in the developedareas,
they are more vulnerable to default than those in the marginal
areas. The same is true for poor householdsas compared to those
in the higher income categories.This is empirically verified by the
statisticaltests conducted in the Floro study. Computation of mean
household propensity to default for each income level in both the
developed and marginal areasshowed that householdsin the devel-
oped area belongingto the lowest income category have the highes t
propensity to default (seeTable 3). The degree of association be-
tween income status and incidence of default was further tested
using ordinary least squaresregressionanalysis. While the negative
correlation between household income and household default rate
was found to be statistically significant at the 99 percent level, the
study area variation effect reflecting differences in technical and
economic conditions was not. This implies that the default ratesof
borrowers within the same income category in the two areaswere
not very different. In other words, the default rate (or alterna-
tively, the repayment capacity) differential across income class
seemsto be more significant than acrossgeographical or environ-
mental areas. To the extent that borrowers' repayment capacity
reflects their "creditworthiness," then income status hasan impor-
tant bearingon the credit termsoffered by lenders.
3. The overallmagnitude of the biasagainst agriculture is reflectedin Da-
vid's(1982) computation of net protectionrateor (NPR).Thepolicybiases
against agriculture areextensively discussed in PIDS(1986).FLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 241
TABLE 3
LOANREPAYMENTPERFORMANCE OF 111HOUSEHOLDS
BY INCOMECLASS AND STUDYAREACATEGORY,
WETSEASON, 1983-84
Mean Standard










B. Changein the Composition of Informal Lenders
As a result of technical change, the composition of informal
lenders in the rural areas hasalso altered. This section presentssome
empirical evidence from the Floro study regarding the replacement
of the "old" group of moneylenders, namely, the landlords, with
the "new" group, namely, the traders and rich farmers. In partic-
ular, it examines the diversity in the economic behavior of the two
dominant lender groups and the subsequent effect on their percep-
tion of risk. Throughout the discussion, the type of agrarian setting
in which these informal lenders operate is also taken into account.
This is especially useful in highlighting any effect of technical change
on the nature of informal lenders and the credit terms that they
offer.
Conceptually, farm households can approach two distinct markets
for loans: (a) the institutional or "formal" credit sector consisting
of private and government financial institutions such ascommercial242 JOURNAL o'F PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
banks, rural banks, Philippine National Bank, etc; and/or (b) the
informal, credit sector comprised of private commercial and non-
commerciallenders(seeChart I).
Recent studies have shown, however, that only a small segment.
of the rural population in the Philippines- mainly largefarmers -
has accessto institutional o7 formal credit (Esguerra 1982; Subido
1981; Sacay et al. 1985). In recent years, there has been a drastic
reduction in the supply of agriculturalcredit provided by the formal
financial institutions due partly to the decrease in the supply of
government-sourced,cheap rediscount funds and the drying up of
agricultural credit subsidy programs (Lamberte and Lira 1987).
It isalsopartly the result of high loan arrearages among rural banks,
forcing some to impose.more stringent conditions as part of their
credit rationing measuresand others to close. 4 In fact the number
of operating banks has declined from 1,214 in 1981 to 1,055 in
1985. This has made formal credit even lessaccessibleto farmers.
According to the Floro study, the contributions of formal lending
institutions to the total volume of loans in favorable and unfavor-
able areasarc 6.16 percent and 10.26 percent, respectively(p. 207).
At the same time, there are limitations to the extent of involve-
ment of noncommercial lenders including friends and rela_tives,
especially in terms of loan size and loan purpose.The restricted
character of noncommercial loans and the limited accessibilityof
rural banks and government-sponsored credit cooperatives make
informal, commercial lenders an important source of rural credit
(Floro 1987).
Informal, commercial lenders have a heterogeneouscomposition.
They can be distinguished by the dominant economic activity in
which they are involved,s The_/ include landlord-lenders,trader-
4. Forinstance, stipulations in theloancontract suchasthose askedbythe
ruralbanks include thefollowingrequirements: (a)a NIA waterrelease certifi-
cate(thisis an announcement that irrigation waterWit,_:Be supplied at such
dates);(b)anaffidavitfromthe Bureau of Lands, MinistrylofAgrarian Reform
or the Landlord stating thesizeoflandunder cultivation; and(c)acleanrecord
of nondefault inpastMasagana-99 oranyagricultural creditloans.
5. Therearecases, in whichlenders are engaged in two economic activities
at thesame time,suchasfarming andtrading.In thissituation, thequestion of
wheretheydevotemoretimeandwhatthey perceiveto betheirmainsource
ofearnings determine theirclassification.FLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 243
lenders, farmer-lenders, and others composed of teachers, local
governmentofficials, businessmen,and others. Thesesourcesextend
both cash credit and credit-in-kind. They operate outside of the
banking system, are not regulated,and are not really monitored like
those in the formal credit sector. Except for the professionalmoney-
lenders for whom lending is the principal source of income, most
of them provide credit asan integral part of their economicactivity.
The Floro study found that the importance of traders particular-
ly in the developedor favorable areasand of rich farmers in the mar-
ginal areasasloan sourcesisquite striking. Landlords, on the other
hand, now play a minor role even in the unfavorable areas where
sharetenancy isstill prevalent (seeTable 4). This is consistent with
TABLE 4





Loan Percent of Loan Percent of
Informal lender volume of total volume of total
type all all
households households
1. Non-Commercial 20,983 10.22 73,185 14.49
a) CreditCooperatives 4,147 2.02 22,775 4.53
b) Relatives/Friends 16,836 8.20 50,410 9.96
2. Commercial 184,314 89.77 432,786 85.51
a) Merchants/Traders 66,187 35.91 255,390 50.46
b) RichFarmers 72,804 39.50 122,431 24.19
c) Landlords 15,114 8;20 4,504 0.89
d) Others a 11,353 6.16 45,399 8.97
TOTAL 205,318 100.00 506,124 100.00
a Theseincludelocalgovernmentofficials,businessmen, employees,
schoolteachers, etc,
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TBAC's (1981) and Sacay et al.'s (1985) findings which traced the
intertemporal changes in the class composition of informal lenders
during the lastthree decades.
1. Withdrawal of Landlords in Money/ending
Landlords have traditionaly played a dominant role in the credit
market. This wastrue throughout the Spanishand American colonial
periods, as well asduring periods when labor supply was problema-
tic (Hester 1924; Dalisay 1937; Constantino 1975; and McLennan
1980). Moreover, asPelzer(1945,p.94)explained:
It is to the advantage of the landlordto havethe tenant indebtedto
him not only because of the highinterestratesbut alsobecause then
the tenantmaybeforcedto doallkindsof extraworkandmaynot leave
his landholding. The debt bindsthe tenantto the landandmakeshim
almosta slaveof the landlords,who thereupon determines everystep
to betaken- thecropto begrownandthetimeof planting andharvest-
ing.
That landlords seemed to figure prominently in the informal credit
market is not surprising since share tenancy, especially in the rice
and corn sectors, had been widespread until the early 1970s. With
the implementation of land reform in 1973, however, landlords had
diminishedin importance.A 1978 surveyconducted by the Technical
Board for Agricultural Credit (TBAC) in three Philippine provinces
showed that landlords provided only 16 percent of the total loan
value in the rural areas(TBAC 1981). The study also noted that:
The reportedchanges in thestructure of ruralcreditmarkets apparently
transpired with the replacement of theoldercropof moneylenders, who
hadbeenin moneylending sincethe Spanish colonialperiod(theland-
lords),by a groupof moneylenders whostartedtheirmoneylending ope-
rations in1968orlater(thetraders). (p. 11)
Survey findings in Floro (1987) alsoshowed that landlordsplayed
only a small role in the lending circuit in 1983-84 (see Table 3).
What seemsto be surprising is that, even in the marginal areawhere
the majority of the rural householdsare either share-tenantsor part
share-tenants, loan provisions by their landlords comprised only
8 percentof their total credit requirements.
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ted to several factors, in the favorable area, the shift from share-
cropping to leasehold and, to some extent, amortization arrange-
ments lessenedthe needfor personalized contact to monitor tenants'
actions. Under these tenure systems, the role of credit as an incen-
tive and monitoring device diminished in importance. The formal
declaration of land reform further weakened the political sanctions
underlying the share tenancy contract. This made the existing land-
lord-tenant relations tenuous, so that the landlord may no longer be
interested in advancing loans to the farmer.
But even landlords in the unfavorable or marginal areas do not
find it in their interest to lend to their tenants. One possible expla-
nation is that they may no longer need credit as a strategic variable
in monitoring or supervising the tenants; instead they may employ
an overseer or katiwala. Also, during prolonged periods of poor har-
vest, landlords may find it more profitable to lend to nontenant
farmers with adjacent landholdings than to their own tenants. Far-
mers are most vulnerable during such times so that the opportunity
for distress salesof land arises.
2. Emergence of Trader.lenders
The advent of new technology in the late 1960s was, to a large
extent, responsible for the emergence of trader-lenders including
input-dealers as a dominant loan source. An imporovement in pro-
ductivity and output levels, accompanied by the development of
infrastructures such as irrigation and roads, opened up new avenues
for profitable undertakings in trade and commerce. Marketed sur-
plus increased both absolutely and as a proportion of production. 6
Division of labor and specialization also emerged as the network
of distribution and marketing channels became more complex.
These made conditions more favorable for the expansion of trading
activity in the agricultural sector.
As farmers became more and more integrated into the market
economy, traders began to assume an increasingly important role
6. This is supported by the findingsof severalempiricalstudies in the Philip-
pines. Mears (1974, p. 81), for example, noted that "the percentageof produc-
tion that has been market-directed has increased from around 20% in 1920 to
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in the distribution system. The traders' involvement in directly
servicing the input and output marketing needs of farmers facili-
tated the development of trader-farmer relationship.
As the scale of trading operations increases, the competition
among traders for grains procurement intensifies. This is in order to
maintain high utilization rates of their marketing-related facilities
including trucks, warehouses, and ricemills (Mears 1974). The big-
ger the distribution network of a trader, the greater is the pressure
to procure a large share of the output market.
Empirical evidence from the Floro study indicates that money-
lending has become an important complementary activity to trading.
Table 5 shows that, for the wet season 1983-84, more than half of
the sample households in each income category sold their output to
TABLE 5
TYPE OF OUTPUT BUYERS, BY STUDY AREA CATEGORY,
WET SEASON 1983-84
(in percentof households with marketedoutput)
Proportionof total households
Type of output buyer Unfavorable Favorable
area area
1. Lendera' 61 67
2. Non-Lender b 34 26
3. NGAc 5 4
4. Others d 2
ALL TYPES 100 100
a. Lender.buVers maybetrader-lenders (ofrice,tobacco, vegetables) orfarmer-lenders.
b. Non-lender buyers maybetraders ormiddlemen whodidnotprovide anyloantothe
farmer-seller
c. NGAisthegovernment-owned marketing agency, National Grains Authority.
d. Others include relatives, friends, etc.
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trader-lenders. On the other hand,the government marketing agency,
the National Grains Authority (NGA), purchased output directly
from a few households, the majority of whom are middle and rich
farmers.7
Another study sup_eststhat, in fact, there may be tacit agreements
between NGA and private traders operating in a locality. Bouis
(I 982) indicated in his study that traders make profits by obtain-
ing palay from farmers during harvest time when the price of output
is at its lowest level and then reselling the palay directly to the Na-
tional Grains Authority at guaranteed floor prices when the market
price increases.
Output procurement by traders is guaranteed by attaching a tie-in
condition to the loan called tampa. This condition requires farmer-
borrowers to sell all of their marketable surplus to trader-lenders
at the price stipulated by the trader-lender. In many cases,this gives
the trader-lender an opportunity to underpric_ the farmer's output.
The prevalence of tampa in the study areasis confirmed by the sur-
vey findings of Fioro (I 987). Table 6 shows that more than half of
the total volume of trader-le_der loans linked to another market
transaction require borrowers to sell their output.
The drive to expand their market share and the growing com-
plexity of the distribution network also induce traders to seek out
farmers to act as middlemen. The growth of trade is constrained
by the limited number of farmers whose economic behavior and
repayment capacity are intimately known to a big trader. This limi-
tation in information access may be overcome by acquiring the
services of marketing agents in local areasfor borrower screening,
loan disbursement, and output payment Collection. The importance
of middlemen or marketing agents in trade expansion and compe-
tition explains why traders also stipulate a tie-in condition requiring
the borrower to act as a marketing agent. Hence, a substantial por-
tion of the loans made by traders is granted to middlemen-farmers
who relend this to other farmers (seeTable 6).
7. The insignificant role playedby the NGA ingrainsmarketing is notsur-
prising. A studyof the agricultural marketingpolicies in the Philippines has
shownthat thereisanapparentlackof government will to implement these
schemes (Deomampo angSardido1979).For instance, transport facilities (to
spare thefarmers oftransportation andtransactions costs) arehardlydeveloped.248 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF TRADER-LENDER LINKED LOANS
BY TYPE OF TIE-IN ARRANGEMENT
BY STUDY AREA CATEGORY, WET SEASON, 1983-84
Unfavorablearea Favorable
area
Loan Percent Loan Percent
Type of tie-in volume of.total volume of total
arrangement of all of all
households households
(in pesos.) (in pesos.)
A. Linked to Circulation 63,206 100.00 253,390 98.9
Activities
1. Required to buy
input/rent machinery ....
2. Required to sell
output 36,091 57.1 142,325 55.5
3. Both (1) and (2) 1,162 1.9 9,194 3.6
4. Required to act as
marketing agent 25,914 41.0 101,576 39.8
B. Linked to Production - - 2_000 1.1
Activities
1. Borrower istenant ....
2. Required to transfer
land rights - - 2,000 1.1
3. Required to render
labor service ....
TOTAL LINKED LOANS 63,206 100.0 255,390 100.0
Source: Floro(1987).• FLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 249
3. The Rise of Former.lenders
Farmer-lenders are another dominant source of loans particularly
in the unfavorable or marginal area as shown in Table 4. To a large
extent, they also fill the void left by the landlords and financial
institutions. As a group, they provide nearly 40 percent of the total
loan volume in the unfavorable area. The relatively low produc-
tivity in the rainfed parts of the Philippines makes it less attractive
for traders to expand their trading operations in the area. With the
exception of cash crop traders such as tobacco dealers, the major-
ity of the traders would only deal with farm households with irriga-
tion pumps and/or with relatively large landholdings. Rich farmers,
on the other hand, are quite active in the lending circuit even in the
marginal area. Not only do interest returns increase their farm earn-
ings; moneylending also provides them with an opportunity to
acquire more land.
Previous empirical studies have acknowledged that rich farmers
and landowners engaged in moneylending not only to earn interest
but also to acquire land usufruct rights (McLennan 1980; Serrano
1983). The persistence of tenancy in rice and corn agriculture
implies that the farmers are mainly producers who have acquired
cultivation rights in exchange for rent but who do not have the right
to dispose of the land. Since there is no legal market for cultivation
rights (i.e., the sale of land amortization or leasehold rights is pro-
hibited), then the primary means by which land usufruct rights
can be transferred is through land acquisition in the event of loan
default.
Moneylending becomes an important complementary activity to
farming whenever it gives the lender leeway in influencing not only
another person's decision to sell land but also the acquisition price
of that land. This is confirmed by the findings of the FIoro study
presented in Table 7. It is shown that slightly more than one-third
of the total amount of loans supplied by farmer-lenders in both
developed and marginal areas actually led to land transfer.
Credit, therefore, may serve as a means of acquiring land as in
colonial times. The survival of the practice of land transfer vis-fi-vis
the debt mechanism can be attributed to several factors. One is the
failure of land reform to abolish tenancy especially in the unfavor-
able areas. Another reason is the inadequately developed land market
juxtaposed with the developed output market. As a result, the more250 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT,
TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF FARMER-LENDER LINKED LOANS
BY TYPE OF TIE-IN ARRANGEMENT





Loan Percent Loan Percent
Type of tie-in volume of total volume of total
arrangement of all of all
households households
A. Linked to Circulation 30,078 62.7 45,584 59.3
Activities
1. Required to buy
input/rent machinery 1,180 2.4 2,280 3.0
2. Required to sell
output 7,605 15.8 32,87.3 42.8
3. Both (1) and (2) 21,293 44.1 10,43.1 13.6
4. Required to act as
marketingagent ....
B. Linked to Production 18,145 37.6 31,250 40.7
Activities
1. Borrower istenant ....
2. Required t0transfer
land rights 18,000 37.3 28,250 36.8
3. Required to render
labor service 145 0.3 3,000 3.9
TOTAL LINKED LOANS 48,224 100.0 76,834 100.0
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common method of acquiring land is not through market transac-
tion but through credit. A third explanation for the presenceof land
tie-in credit is the economic vulnerability of the majority of Philip-
pine farmers. Their general inability to make ends meet especially
during prolonged periods of drought, persistent crop failures, or
unexpected emergency casesrequiring large cash outlays meansthat
farmers are sometimes compelled to give up a portion of their land-
holdings to pay accumulated debts or to acquire an unusually large
amount of loan.
it can also be noted in Table 7 that some farmer-lenders require
borrowers to buy inputs and/or sell output in both favorable and
unfavorable areas.This may be explained by the existence of asub-
group of farmer-lenders who have limited capital of their own for
lending and, hence, borrow loans for relending purposes from trader-
lenders. This accessto substantially large volumes of loan (over and
above the farmer's consumption and production needs) requires
middlemen-farmers to ensure that borrowers sell their output to
trader-lenders.
C. Changesin Credit Terms
The promotion of new technology and the uneven pace at which
this is taking place in the rice and corn sectors have facilitated the
emergence of a heterogeneous group of lenders with diverse eco-
nomic considerations. The coexistence of different types of lenders
implies different lenders' perception of risk and borrower-credit-
worthiness. Floro (1987) argued that the specificities of trading
activity and of the process of land acquisition have led not only
to the adoption of a selective lending strategy but also to a lender.
borrower sorting phenomenon. This implies that the price of credit
charged by different lenders would depend on the characteristics
of borrowers and would take different forms including output under-
pricing, input overpricing, and land acquisition.
Trader-lenders and farmer-lenders provide farmers accessto cred-
it based on different perceptions of risk and under different selec-
tion criteria. Taking into consideration the fact that farmer-lenders'
gains to moneylending include land acquisition and that this may
take place only in the event of loan default, then farmer-lenders
would tend to prefer a borrower who has low repayment capacity.
Trader-lenders, on the other hand, prefer to lend to farmers with252 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
high repayment capacity. Moreover, they require the farmer's antici-
pated harvest to be put up as collateral since they are involved in
the buying and selling of farmers' output. The more marketable
a farmer's output is, the more "creditworthy" he is. in contrast,
farmer-lenders' direct involvement in the production process makes
land a desirable form of collateral. Since poor farmers, particularly
in the marginal or unfavorable areas, are the most vulnerable to for-
tuitous circumstances such as sickness and bad harvests, then they
are likely to offer land ascollateral.
The Floro study provided empirical evidence that trader-lenders
and farmer-lenders sort prospective borrowers according to different
risk and collateral criteria. The results of statistical tests using condi-
tional probabilities and analyses of variance suggestthat, in general,
farmer-lenders allocate a greater volume of their loans to poor far-
mers while trader-lenders concentrate on rich farmers.
This borrower pattern is alsoreflected in the credit terms which
lenders offer to certain types of borrowers. The strong positive
correlation found by Floro between loan size and income level of
the borrower, for instance, implies that traders tend to offer bigger
loans to farmers with higher income. The strong negative correlation
between the effective interest rate charged by traders and borrower's
income suggests that trader-lenders differentiate their interest rate
charges on the basisof the borrower's income status. Rich borrowers
are charged lower interest rates than poor borrowers since the former
have lower default propensity. The study area variation effect,
however, wasfound to benot statistically significant. In other words,
there is no significant difference in the interest rates between favor-
able and unfavorable areas. Technical change, while bringing about
a change in the composition of credit suppliers, may not have any
significant impact on the cost of credit.
Farmer-lenders, in contrast to trader-lenders, tend to offer flexi-
ble credit terms to poor farmers. The results from the multiple
regression analysis in the Floro study indicate that farmer-lender
behavior does not subscribe to the standard theories of interest
rate determination. Farmer-lenders offered bigger loans at lower
interest rates to poor borrowers than to rich borrowers. Such be-
havior makes sense if the farmer-lenders want to induce the poor
borrowers to default and if the loan size has a positive effect on
default; A large loan relative to income allows the possibility of
substantial loan default and subsequently of land transfer. FloroFLORO: I NFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 253
(1987) pointed out that if a borrower wants to avoid land transfer
by spreadinghis loan demand over several lenders, then a farmer-
lender is ableto work around this responseby offering lower interest
rates, allowing rollover of defaulted loans, or simply giving lenient
terms of credit. The willingness of farmer-lenders to offer lower
interest rates and relatively bigger loans to poor borrowers sug-
gest that the farmer-lenders will choose those credit terms that
weaken the borrower's resistanceto land mortgage (p. 266).
The relative insignificanceof the study area variation effect on
interest rates in the regressionanalysis indicates that, contrary to
popular belief, there is no difference in the effective monthly in-
terestrateschargedby the farmer-lenders in the favorable or unfavor-
able areas. This can be expected since it was argued earlier 1_hat
interest returns are not the primary reasonwhy rich farmers engage
in moneylending. These results also support the hypothesis that
interest rate differential acrossgeographicalor environmental areas
isnot asimportant asthat acrossincome classes.
The opposite is true, however, for relative loan sizes.The regres-
sion results in the study suggestthat, for a given income class,
borrowers in the developedor favorable area receivedsignificantly
bigger loans than their counterparts in the marginalor unfavorable
area. This is consistent with the findings that rural householdswhich
adopt modern technology have a higher debt burden than those
usingtraditional cultivation methods. At the same time, if the pres-
ence of irrigation systems and the application of modern inputs in
favorable areasincrease the expected land value, then farmer-lenders
may be willing to lend bigger loans to poor borrowers in favorable
areasthan to their counterparts in the marginal areas.
The regression results just presented are further supported by the
data in Table 8. Computing for the conditional probabilities, the
table shows that there is a high probability that the mortgagee (the
lender who stipulates land as collateral) is a farmer-lender. This is
true not only in the unfavorable area but also in the favorable area.
These aggregated conditional probabilities, however, mask an im-
portant difference among income classes.Table 9 shows that most
of the mortgaged lands belong to poor farmers.
It might be noted that the probability of a poor household mort-
gaginghis land in the unfavorable area is higher than that of a poor
household in the favorable area. The opposite is true for higher






Unfavorable area Favorable area
t
Number Estimated Number Estimated
of probabilities of probabilities Typeof mortgagee
mortgage thatthe land mortgage that the land
loans ismortgaged loans ismortgaged
to lendertype. to lendertype.
1. Farmer-lender 11 .6875 7 .7778
2. Trader-lender - - 1 .1111
3. Non-farmer lender 3 .1875 - -
4. Relative 2 .1250 1 .1111
ALL TYPES 16 9
Source: Floro (1987).
have to mortgage their land is higher in favorable areasthan in un-
favorable areas. This may beexplained by the fact that, while among
poor borrowers it is the inability to meet their consumption needs
during bad production periods that compels them to mortgage their
land, loans with land mortgage received by middle and rich house-
holds are usually intended for specific "investments" such as higher
education, acquisition of farm machinery, etc. Uhlike "distress"
loans, these types of mortgage loans are expected to be repaid
once the specific "investments" pay off. The fact that there are
relatively more opportunities for such investments in the favorable
areas explains why middle and rich households in those areas are
willing to obtain a loan requiring land ascollateral.FLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 2§5
TABLE 9
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES
OF HOUSEHOLDSWITH LAND MORTGAGES,
25 MORTGAGE LOANS, BY STUDY AREA AND INCOME
CLASSCATEGORIES, WET SEASON, 1983-84.
Unfavorable Favorable
area area
Income No. of HH Probabilitythat No. of HH Probability
class w/ land a HH belonging w/ land that a HH





1. Poor 15 .4411 5 .2052
2. Middle 1 .0909 3 .1579
3. Large - .0000 1 .0625
TOTAL 16 9
Probability





D. Summary of Findings
The impact of technical change on the rural household's demand
for credit, the present composition of informal lenders and their
credit terms have been examined in the first part of this paper. Us-
ing the findings of the Floro study on Philippine food (rice and corn)
agriculture for empirical verification, this paper shows that:
1. Technical change has brought about an increased demand for256 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
credit which hasled to the higher debt burden of rural households.
2. Technical changefacilitated the emergenceof a new group of
lenders - the traders - whose risk and collateral considerations
are different from those of the traditional groupof informal lenders
(the landlords) and farmer-lenders.
3. The uneven spread of agricultural development and commer-
cialization allows for the coexistence of diversegroups of lenders.
Their different economic considerationslead to a sorting pheno-
menon whereby trader-lenders prefer to lend to rich households
while farmer-lenders prefer to lend to poor householders. This
lender-sortingbehaviorhasresultedin market fragmentation.
4. The presence of market fragmentation in the informal credit
sectorpartly explainswhy technical changedid not necessarilylead
to a reduction in the cost of credit to farmers. The high risksfaced
by farmers due not only to the vagariesof nature but.alsoto market
fluctuations and the absenceof- infrastructures and public services
make default risk a seriousconcern even among informal lenders,
particularly the traders. What has simply changedis the manner in
which lenderssort their borrowersand the form in which they charge
interest. Loans provided by trader-lenders almost always require
tie-in output sales, and/or middlemen services.While these types
of market interlinkages also occurred among farmer-lender loans,
farmer.lenders tend to link their loans with land mortgagesas well.
5. The differential impact of technical change on rural house-
holds is determined by the income status of the household. The
emergence of trader-lenders, for instance, has a significant effect
on the availability of credit to rich households,but not necessarily
to poor households,in caseswhere trader-lendersdo lend to poor
borrowers, the effective rate charged, inclusive of any implicit
chargessuch as underpricing of output and overpricing of inputs,
ismuchhigher thanthat cha_rged to rich borrowers.
Undoubtedly, the introduction of modern technology hasopened
up new opportunities to put credit to productiveusein agriculture.
The adoption of modern technology has increased the farmer's
output and, hence, his grossfarm earnings. But whether this is
enough to cover his debts (including interest)depends upon several
other factors including the structure of the informal credit market.
While technical change has facilitated the rise of trader-lenders,
accessibility to their loans isborrower-clossspeciflc. This affects not
only the amount which a farmer is able t° borrow but alsothe costFLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS. _7
at which he obtains the loan. Given the structure of the informal
credit market, credit accessbility_oecomes highly dependent on the
incomestatusof borrowers.
IV. Policy Implications
The policy implications of the present discussionare far reach-
ing and not immediately obvious. Rather than lay down any com-
prehensive policy guidelines or examine the social and economic
costsand benefits involved in making the choice among alternative
sets of policies, this section discusses the possibleimplications of
different policy emphases.
A. Lagged Growth of the Rural Financial Marhets
While technical changehasfacilitated the rapid growth of product
and input markets during the lasttwo decades,the growth of rural
financial markets haslaggedbehind. This is largely due to the struc-
tural characteristicsof the agricultural sectorand to the institutional
and policy environment which has promoted a biasagainstagricul-
ture. The existence of high transactions costs due to the presence
of risk and uncertainty in agriculture has made its credit risk rating
traditionally poorer than that of the commercial and manufactur-
ing sectors. In addition, the general inability of many farmers to
make ends meet during periods of natural calamities or crop fai-
lures,as well as during times of emergency suchassicknessor death
in the family, has led to high formal loan arrearages. As a result,
most organized financial institutions, with the exception of rural
banks, have chosento stay in the periphery asfar as rural financing
is concerned and have concentrated their financial activities on
the urban areas(Lamberte and Lim 1987; Ozaeta 1987).
Specific government interventions in the form of credit quotas,
interest rate regulations, and loan targeting have accentuated the
problem of rural financial markets. Empirical studies and project
evaluations reveal the costly failure of these government schemes
and the deleterious effects of these policies on the development of
rural financial markets (Esquerra 1981; Von Pischke et al. 1983;
Adamset al. 1.984;Lamberte 1985).
The creation of specializedagricultural credit agenciesand credit
programs only limited the opportunity for portfolio diversificatior25'8 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and thereby increased the risk faced by credit programs and credit
agencies. Loan target specification often required screening proce-
dures,detailed monitoring and supervision which raised the effec-
tive costsof lending.The imposition of interest rate controls, more-
over, impelled financial institutions to make useof nonprice alloca-
tive mechanisms to ration credit. The concessionary rediscount
rates offered by the Central Bank to priority sectors like agricul-
ture have actually paralyzed the savings mobilization activity of
financial institutions (Gonzales-Vega 1983). Instead of helping
develop the rural financial system, they merely encouraged the
financial intermediaries to become heavily dependent on the Central
Bank for Ioanable funds. This also discouragedthem from increas-
ing their own funds vis-a-visrural deposit mobilization.
The increased flow of subsidized credit funds to agriculture in
the late sixties up to the late seventies was thus not accompanied
by parallel improvements in the environment for rural finance,
much less by wider credit accessibility. Due to high arrearages,
many formal financial institutions who acted asconduits for these
government credit subsidieswere plagued by the problem of non-
repayment of loans. This only increasedthe number of ineligible
farmer-borrowers since loan repayment was one of the main require-
mentsfor subsequentloan provisions. As the source of cheapcredit
began to dry up, eligibility for subsequentborrowings became more
stringent. Both the commercial and rural banks required that pre-
vious loan obligations be met. They began to impose lower loan
ceilings and asset collateral requirements. Although the credit sub-
sidy program was originally designedto benefit the small farmers,
the formal financial institutions favored lending to more viable,
lessrisky farmers with larger landholdings. This made formal loans
accessible to an even smaller segmentof the rural population.
The reduction of credit subsidiesin the early eightiesaccentuated
the decline of formal credit allocated to agriculture (David 1982).
Banks, as profit-maximizing entitles, sought to lend to those sec-
tors where their combined costs of funds and of supervision were
relatively lower, mainly the urban sector (Tolentino 1986). The
inability of the formal financial sector to servicethe growing finan-
cial needs of the rural population indicates that the rural financial
markets havenot kept pace with the development of other markets.FLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 259
B. Comparative Advantage of the Informal Sector
While the formal financial intermediaries remain impaired in the
rural areas,the informal credit sector has remained resilient in the
face of government intervention and market distortions. In fact, it is
able to cope remarkably well with the recent changesin agricultural
production brought about by technologicaldevelopment and govern-
ment policies. TBAC (1981), Serrano (1983), Sacay et al. (1985),
and Flora (1987) demonstratedthat the informal financial market is
a highly flexible sector that adjusts itself to prevailing economic
conditions.
The preceding section has shown that technical change altered
not only the existing system of production but alsothe accompany-
ing system of informal finance. With the introduction of land reform
and modern technology in agriculture, the traditional group of
moneylenders - the landlords - have withdrawn. The void they
left in the credit market hasbeen quickly filled by the new crop of
moneylenders- the trader-lendersand farmer-lenders. The terms of
credit also changedfrom tied-in tenant credit to output and land
tie-in arrangementsto accommodatechangesin relations of produc-
tion and exchange. Moreover, these informal credit sources were
more efficient in terms of deliveringcredit to farmers. Ozaeta (1987
pp. 3-4) noted that
because of their essentially localand indigenous operations, they have
access to morecreditinformation. Thustheirloanprocessing isnecessarily
quickerandtheircreditdecisions aremadeonthe spot.Secondly, their
flexibilityallowsthemto lendbothfor production andfor interimcon-
sumptionneedsof their borrowers. The fact thatfundsborrowed may
beusedfor purposes notrelatedto cropproduction since creditisfungi-
ble,doesnot affecttheircollectionperformance. Thirdly,their lending
operations areunregulated and thereforenot subjectto reportingand
monitoringbureaucracies. Lastly, their lendingoperations are merely
peripheral activities.., theirbreadandbutter beingtheir trademargins
andnottheirfinancing income.
These explain why informal lenders are able to reduce their adminis-
trative and risk costs while at the same time providing smaller loan
sizes during times that they are needed.
C. Policy Strategies towards Revitalizing RFMs
The comparative advantage of informal lenders over financial260 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
institutions with respect to information accessand to enforcement
of credit terms, aswell asto their "unregulated" and "unsupervised"
nature, hasstimulated discussion amongpolicymakers and academics.
The new concensusthat is emergingtoday is that the informal cre-
dit sector plays a significant role in credit allocation in the rural
areas. Its widespreadusesuggests, that it is well suited to most rural
conditions (Von Pischkeet al. 1983, p. 8):
But while there is general agreement that the informal sector is
more efficient than the formal credit sector, there are differences
among policymakers and economic adviserson the type of financial
strategy to pursue and on the type of credit channel to use.Some
argue that financial market revitalization should betargeted towards
the rehabilitation of formal financial institutions particularly the
rural banks. Others hold the view that integrating the informal
sector into the formal sector would greatly enhance the overall
performance of the rural financial system. Both sides, hpwever;
agree that there are lessonsthat can be gleanedfrom the informal
sector operations which are useful for making policy adjustments.
1. Financiel Libereiizetion Strategy
One major policy reform that has been introduced as part of
the formal financial institutions' rehabilitation package is financial
liberalization. The informal lenders are largely unconstrained by
government policies such as legal ceilings on interest rates so that
they are able to offer more flexible repayment schemesand credit
terms. This implies that a move away from specialized, supervised
credit programs and the removal of unnecessary and distortionary
government regulations in the financial system may be beneficial.
In 1984, the government has started to addressthe distortions in
the rural financial markets by deregulating someaspectsof the finan-
cial system. Lending and deposit interest rate ceilings have been
removed. Treasury bills are being auctioned while Central Bank
bills are slowly being phased out. The rediscounting rates have been
adjusted to approximate the market rate. Selective credit controls
have also been lifted.
However, other aspects of financial intermediation such asbank
entry and credit quotas remain, subject to government control.
The absence of free entry in the banking system has limited the
volume of funds mobilized in the rural areas aswell as the varietyFLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 261
of financial services provided (Lamberte and tim 1987). Current
branching regulations in the Philippines are perceived to be one-
rous especially to rural financial institutions. For instance, the
requirement to purchasea minimum amount of specialgovernment
securitiesfor every new branch is a form of entry barrier. It allows
existing banks, whether efficient or inefficient, to appropriate rents
in a certain area (Lamberte and Lira 1987).
The agricultural loan quota scheme required all banking institu-
tions to set asideat least 25 percent of their Ioanable funds genera-
ted for agricultural credit. It was designed to encourage urban-
oriented institutions to undertake rural lending and to mobilize
available resources for agricultural development. But, as pointed
out by a Central Bank memorandum, the scheme did not serveto
increasethe flow of funds to the agriculturalsector.On the contrary,
it only resulted in penalizing nonagricultural borrowers and at the
same time increasingthe banks' cost of intermediation. Critics of
the two government restrictions are thus pushingfor their removal
to help promote more competition between formal and informal
lendersin the ruralfinancial markets.
2. Dlversificotion of Formal Financial Institutions
One policy recommendation that has recently gained attention
is allowing the banks to diversify into allied activities suchastrad-
ing, marketing, etc. The interlinking of credit wuth other markets
appears attractive since informal lenders' accessto information and
enforcement of credit terms relates to this feature of informal cre-
dit markets. The predominanceof market interlinkage hasextensive-
ly been discussedin the literature (Bardhan 1980; Braverman and
Stiglitz 1980, to name a few). When markets are characterizedby
high transactions cost and asymmetric information, moral hazard
problems are not insignificant. Interlinking of markets isa response
to the imperfect characterof markets.
Moreover, proponents of this policy strategy argue that market
interlinkage enhancesthe control of lendersunder conditions of risk
and uncertainty. For instance, the presenceof a tie-in salearrange-
ment strengthensthe market position of traders as output-buyers.
Output price determination is now made by contract rather than
through the forces of supply and demand. On the other hand, the
lender's involvement in a trading activity provideshim with a strong262 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
organization for controlling credit .flows (i.e., tracking the farmer's
activity from his acquisition of inputs to planting and harvesting)
andfor enforcing repayment schedules.
Besides, the costs of loan screening, supervision, and monitoring
may be accommodated by the substantial trading margins. In other
words, involvement in trading and related activities also opens addi-
tional profit opportunities to the financial intermediary in the form
of markups on the input sales and margins on the output purchases.
While it may indeed be tempting to jump into the bandwagon
of "interlinked markets," one needsto raise the question of whether
rural financial institutions are motivated to engage in trading and
other related activities. Do they have the technical and managerial
skills necessary to run a trading operation? Given this to bethe case,
there is a strong possibility that financial institutions may evolve
into agricultural development corporations involved not only in lend-
ing but alsoin marketing, input dealing, and brokering.
Such a scheme, however, may run against the goal of wider credit
accessibility. Financing can easily be limited to the trading and rela-
ted activity in which the financial institution is engaged so that it
still stays in the periphery as far as rural financing is concerned.
Further studies are required to provide empirical support to the dif-
ferent positions on this issue. The impact of this scheme on bank
competition in general and on credit allocation in particular needs
to beexamined.
3. Integration of the Informal Sector
The banks' inability to provide an efficient credit delivery system
has led to the development of other policy schemesthat maximize
the role of the informal sector. Informal lenders have increasingly
been recognized asefficient credit channels to a majority of the rural
population who have little or no accessto formal institutions. Seve-
ral financing strategies using informal lenders - traders, in partic-
ular - as conduits of government Ioanable funds have been con-
sideredby the Monetary Board as a result. Since 1984, two credit
schemes involving informal lenders have been implemented, namely:
(a) the Quedan Guarantee Fund Board tieup scheme, and (b) the
End users/Input Suppliers Assistancescheme.
Under the first arrangement, participating banks provide produc-
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but subject to a tie-in stipulation that the grain harvest or a portion
of it be sold to a specified quedan-franchised operator, usually a
rice miller or wholesaler. Loan collection is done for the lending
bank by the operator who, in turn, receives a quedan loan at 6 per-
cent interest during harvest time for grains procurement. Such a
scheme is designed to take .advantage of the traders' efficiency at
loan collection, thereby lowering the risk of default and, at the same
time, lowering the transactions cost to the borrower by allowing him
to pay the loan in kind.
The end-users/input suppliers assistance scheme extends produc-
tion credit to farmers using end-users and input suppliers as con-
duits. Loan funds under this arrangement are channeled through an
agent bank by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. End-users
are individuals or enterprises who purchase farm produce for further
processing while input suppliers are those who sell inputs to farmers.
Two types of tie-in requirements are stipulated under this scheme.
Loans from input suppliers require the farmer to obtain his produc-
tion inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and chemicals from the input
supplier-lender. This is to ensure timely and adequate provision of
the production inputs and, at the same time, provide the required
technical assistance. The end-users, on the other hand, require
farmers to sign contracts to deliver the specified volume of their
produce at harvest time at a buying price which must not be lower
than the prevailing NFA support price.
The agent banks charge an interest rate of 6 percent per annum
(inclusive of service charges) to the input suppliers/end-users, and,
in turn, the latter relend the loan to the farmer at 15 percent per
annum. The stipulated loan period is 160 days from the date of re-
financing. Amounts not paid within this period are subject to a pe-
nalty rate of 42 percent per annum.
The policy of channeling formal credit to informal lenders hasbeen
justified on the grounds of efficiency and increased financial integ-
ration. With respect to efficiency, the abovementioned programs are
judged on the basis of repayment performance. Both the quedan
financing scheme and the end-users/input suppliers scheme have
high repayment rates as shown in Table 10. Unlike the previous
specialized credit programs of the government, the high loan reco-
very indicates that theseschemesare doing quite well.
If one is concerned, however, with wider credit accessibility
and increased financial integration especially among small farmers,264 JOURNAL OFPHiLiPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 10
SUMMARY PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED CREDIT
PROGRAMS ASOF SEPTEMBER 30, 1986
(Amount in millionpesos)





processors 1,767.3 1,625.5 99.8






Program 46,776 32,225 89.0
2. ExpandedCorn
Program 78,328 57,073 94.0
3. National Rootcrops
Program 6,601 1,520 -
TOTAL 139,025 90,818 92.0
Source: National Food andAgricultural Council (NFAC)
Agricultural CreditPolicyCouncil (ACPC).
the extent to which the two policies are able to meet this policy
objective depends not only on the volume of credit available in
agriculture but, more importantly, on the farmers' access to these
funds and on the terms at which they obtain credit.
An initial evaluation of the end-user/input supplier scheme indi-
cates that no direct verification has been made on whether the funds
channeled through the informal conduits reached more farmer-
borrowers and on what terms these loans were offered (Esguerra
1987). It is also iml_licit in the two policy schemes that:
(a) Provision of more credit funds to informal lenders will lead
to wider credit accessibility because end-users/input suppliers areFLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 265
required to provide credit no higher than the stipulated loan ceiling
per hectare which isequivalent to the costof material inputs and the
farmer's shareof the crop insurancepremium.
(b) Cheap cost of funds to informal lenderswill leadto a reduc-
tion in the borrowing costof farmers.
(c) There are no implicit chargesto farmers, i.e., underpricing
of output or overpricingof inputs.
In other words, it is assumedthat credit provision to the agricul-
tural sector under the two schemeswill not only stimulate broad-
based rural development and productivity growth but also increase
the flow of credit funds and the provision of financial servicesto
smallfarmers.
The study by Floro suggests,however, that these assumptions
may not be consistent with the particular lending behaviorof trader-
lenders and the heterogeneouscharacter of credit market agents.
The sorting phenomenon that has been observed in the Philippine
informal credit market implies that informal lenderssort their pros-
pective borrowers according to their particular risk and collateral
criteria. With regardto trader-lenders,they tend to allocate agreater
proportion of their loans to rich households.This meansthat wider
credit accessibility may not necessarilytake place under the informal
lenders' conduit schemes. Any additional funds available to the
informal lender may result in bigger loansfor the samenumber of
farmers.
A president of a development bank operating in the rural areas
familiar with trader-lendersoperation remarked that "millers (only)
give production credit to their farmer "sukis" (regularclients who,
in turn, will pay them back in time). This may not be the most
equitable way of doing it. This may not be helping directly the
farmers, but this ishow the system goes" (de Guzman 1987, p. 5).
Another issueof concern is the effect of credit subsidy to the
informal lenderson the costof borrowing to smallfarmers. The end-
users/input suppliersassistance schemeoffers a credit line with maxi-
mum ceiling of 1 million pesosfor individualsand 1.5 million pesos
for corporate borrowersand cooperatives when loansare unsecured.
The amounts are higher for securedloans.Given the relatively large
loansprovided to informal lenders, it is likely that the target clien-
tele are big input dealerssuch as the Philippine Planters' Product,
Inc., and big rice millers with an averagecapital of 2 million pesos.
Floro (1987) showsthat big traders and ricemillersseek out mid-266 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
dlemen whom they trust, who haveassets and resourcesfor leverage,
and who know the farmers in the area very well. Trader-lenders
therefore entrust substantial loan amounts to selectedrich farmers
in order to buy output from other farmers.This layer of middlemen/
jobbers forms the credit-marketing channel in the rural areas.Credit
may therefore pass through several banks before finally reaching
the small farmer-borrowers. There is no assurancethat the conces-
sionary rate of interest given to the big end-user/input supplier
will be passedon to the farmer-borrower. Neither isthere any assur-
ance that no underpricing of output or overpricing of inputs will
take place as stipulated in the contract agreement. A legitimate
question that needsto beansweredin this regardis,what proportion
of the credit subsidy under the end-users/input suppliersassistance
scheme is captured by the trader-recipient and the middlemen-
lenders?Any monitoring or supervision of loan disbursementby the
informal lenders will therefore need to take into account the pre-
sence(or absence)of a developedcredit delivery system not different
from the marketing channel.
Besides,if financial liberalization is the general policy currently
being undertaken by the government, then subsidized loans to
informal lenders are not in keeping with this policy. The previous
discussionsuggeststhat credit subsidy programs are neither effi-
cient nor equitable instrumentsof channelingcredit to smallfarmers.
Pastexperienceshaveshownthat subsidizedloanswere concentrated
in the hands of bankable farmers with higher income. Moreover,
there is the possibility that credit, being fungible, may have been
diverted to other uses.
The subsidized cost of funds for informal traders is no different
from the rediscount subsidies that were generously granted to
government banks and rural banks. The legitimate questionraised
by Esguerra (1981)on who pays and who benefits from Masagana
- 99 credit subsidy may also be applied to the 139 million pesos
end users/input suppliers assistancescheme. A more detailed inquiry
on this issue may possibly reveal findings similar to Esguerra'sstudy
which indicated that the subsidies granted by the government
through the M-99 program, although meant to be fully enjoyed
by farmer-borrowers, were largely captured by the lenders.
One may also raise the question of the necessity of credit sub-
sidy program to stimulate informal lenders to mobilize bigger
volumes of funds into agriculture. Does it help forge formal informalFLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 267
market linkages and improve the efficiency of rural financial mar-
kets? Several private bankers notably those of the Luzon Develop-
ment Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands,and Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank admit that they have beenfinancing traderseven
before the scheme took effect in 1984. In fact, "most commercial
banks have chosen to stay in the periphery asfar as rural financing
is concerned. A common practice is to finance only the traders
and processors." (Ozaeta, 1967, p. 6). This implies that formal-
informal linkages already exist within the financial system. Loans
are granted to informal lenders on the basis of their marketing/
trading activity, not their lending activity.
A portion of these bank loans, especiallythose with short matur-
ity periods, are used as trader operating capital for purchasing
output from farmers. Floro (1987) has shown that the movement
of the traders' operating capital corresponds with the cycles of
production and of lending. Between harvest times, operating capital
is used for lending purposesby traders. Loans are releasedduring
planting season and collected at harvest time. Instead of paying
the farmer during harvest for his output, traders advance the pay-
ment in the form of loans at the start of production period. It isin
this manner that formal loans received by traders are recycled as
credit to farmers. Providing traders with more credit capital at sub-
sidized rates under the present assistancescheme may actually be a
pointlessexercise.
A number of studies have drawn attention to the impact of the
policy schemes involving informal lenders on the distribution of
income in the rural areas (Floro 1987, Lamberte and Lim 1987).
Floro (1987) focuses on the bilateral relationship between agents
with unequal market power. Her study argues that the existence
of power relations affects the bargaining process of contracting
parties in markets. Lamberte and Lim (1987) support this view and
issue warnings on hasty policy formulations. They stressedthat
traders usually have information about market prices which the
farmers do not have and that they possesstransaction-specific
assetswhich strengthen their bargainingpower.
In this regard, the recommended credit programsmust also be
carefully examined as to whether they directly or indirectly exa-
cerbate the prevailing conditions of the economic environment.
Floro points out that one big drain on the farmers' earnings are
the "hidden charges" such as the underpricing of palay prices by268 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
traders and the overpricing of fertilizer and pesticides by input
dealers.Another is the threat of land reduction or land lossvis-a-vis
the lending operations of rich farmers. In the long run, suchcredit
practices undermine the stability and viability of the rural popula-
tion which then feeds on the high risk and high cost perception of
rural financial institutions regai_ding the agriculturalsector.
In calling attention to the complexity of the RFM operations,the
preceding discussionissuesa note of caution for policymakers con-
cerning the use of informal lenders in the rural financial interme-
diation. A thorough understanding of the informal credit markets
in a rural environment characterizedby imbalanceof power isessen-
tial to avoid dangerously misleading conclusions.History isreplete
with lessonson the many government "remedies" that only perpe-
tuate and deepenthe poverty of smallfarmers.
D. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the rural financial market, given its vital role in pro-
viding financial servicesto the agricultural sector, requires govern-
ment assistancein improving its performance and in meeting the new
challengesposed by the new agricultural development program. But
any rehabilitation policy package,whether it involvesthe formal sec-
tor alone or includesthe informal sectoraswell, must be organizant
of the basicroots of the problem. The laggedgrowth of the RFMs,
in comparison with other rural markets, isthe resultnot only of past
government policies but also of the current state of the economic
environment. Most farmers face high input pricesand low output
prices, do not own their landholdings, obtain poor and unstable
yields, earn incomeswhich are barely enough to meet their subsis-
tence needs, and have limited or no accessto government services
and to markets. Government policies in the pasttended to be biased
againstagriculture. There is absenceof good transport linksand sup
port infrastructureslike irrigation in many rural areas.The termsoi
trade have remained unfavorable to the agricultural sector. These
conditions essentially made agricultural lending more risky and cost-
ly relative to industry and commerce.
The World Bank (1983) report has shown that one of the main
causes of high arrearages in credit programs, besidesnatural cala-
mities, is the prevalence of small farmers' income which does not
allow them to meet their consumption requirements, to pay theirFLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 269
debts, and to saveor place surplusfunds in banks at the same time.
With resourcesbeing fungible, a substantial shareof the additional
funds received through the credit programsis utilized for purposes
not related to crop production. The World Bank, in fact, emphasizes
that misallocation of credit arises when borrowersof formal credit
have sizable accumulated debts or significant unsatisfied priorities
such as family health, education,etc. No matter how well-organized,
efficiently managed and economically sound the rural financial in-
stitutions, their successin terms of credit delivery and savings mobi-
lization in the broader rural population will alsohave to depend on
the overallimprovement of farmers' economicwell-being.
Recommended policy reforms which include lessloan targeting,
the removal of credit subsidiesto both the formal and informal
sectors, and more lenient bank entry and bank branching regula-
tions are indeed necessaryto improve the efficiency of RFM opera-
tions. But to solve the rural credit dilemma, these policies are not
enough. As Floro (1987) remarked:
In the shortrun, sucha policygoalrequires enhancing the bargaining
position of smallfarmersandincreasing marketcompetition. Onemeans
by whichthiscanbe achieved is by allowing themto formcreditand
marketing cooperatives. Theseandothertypesof farmer.initiated credit
institutions enhance marketcompetition andimproveonthe efficiency
of creditallocation. (p.289)
In the longer run, however, credit programsmust be accompanied
by government policies that will ensure the increasedincomesand
economic viability of the majority of the rural population which
would then improve the repayment capacity of borrowers as well
as stimulate savings. As Gonzales-Vega (1986, p. 9) pointed out,
"credit interventions cannot correct for the negative impact of
other policies or compensate for low returns from rural invest-
ments." A successfulcredit policy must therefore be linked to
other policies such as land reform, pricing policy, infrastructure
development, etc. (Lamberte and Lim 1987). Without thesepolicy
reforms, the impact of any credit-supply related strategy may prove
to be limited.APPENDIX I
STUDY AREA CLASSIFICATION OF tl I FARM HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE OF _a
ENVIRONMENT AND PROXIMITY TO TOWN MARKETS _:_
SELECTED PROVINCES, WET SEASON, 1983-84
Characteristics Province location of households
Cagayan lloilo Nueva E¢ija
(HH = 20) (HH = 38) (HH = 53)
Farm ]oca_on Upland Lowland Lowland Plateau/ Lowland Lowland Lowland
ralnfed rainfed irrigated Upland irrigated rainfed irrigated
rainfed
Averagefarm size 4.8 3.4 7.1 3.9 216 2.4 1.7
Usageof
fertilizer tow low medium/low tow high medium high
Usageof tractor, none none partial none f_ll partial fur
thre_he.a', etc.
Averagerice fietd 814 1176 3132 2764 4620 3552 4340 C "n
Z
Accesstonearest :_
town market 10-15 km. 5.06 km. 4"7 kin. 8-14 kin, 0.5-3 kin. 5-g km. 2,4 kin. r
O








Unfavorablearea .................. 49 m
Favorablearea.................... 62
U - Unfavorable m
F - Favorable Z --tFLORO: INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 271
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